Sexual Orientation: Testing the Universality
of International Human Rights Law
Holning Laut
Until recently, the United States consistently opposed cultural
relativism while embracing universalism in international human rights
law. Relativists argue that understandings of right and wrong vary
along cultural lines, and thus, definitions of human rights should vary
accordingly.' Islamic states have argued for a Muslim conception of
women's rights;2 China has defended its treatment of political dissidents by invoking Confucian norms;3 and numerous African states
have sought to justify female circumcision' by upholding the practice's
cultural sanctity.' Such assertions of cultural relativism have routinely
elicited American criticism. At the 1993 World Conference on Human
Rights, Secretary of State Warren Christopher proclaimed: "We cannot let cultural relativism become the last refuge of repression. 6 Since
then, Christopher's words have echoed in the United States's diplomatic relations and treaty negotiations. Thanks in part to American
lobbying, universalism now underpins major human rights instruments
such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR); and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).
t
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For general background on universalism and cultural relativism, see Henry J. Steiner and
Philip Alston, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics Morals 166-225 (Oxford
1996).
2
See Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Universal versus Islamic Human Rights:A Clash of Cultures
or a Clash with a Construct?,15 Mich J Intl L 307,329-33,360 (1994).
3
See Michael C. Davis, Chinese Perspectives on Human Rights, in Michael C. Davis, ed,
Human Rights and Chinese Values: Legal, Philosophical,and PoliticalPerspectives 3, 12-16 (Oxford 1995).
4
Female circumcision is also known as female genital mutilation.
5
Steiner and Alston, InternationalHuman Rights at 240-54 (cited in note 1).
6
Elaine Sciolino, US. Rejects Notion That Human Rights Vary with Culture,NY Times Al
(June 15,1993).
7
See, for example, Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 Stan L Rev
1479,1495 (2003) (noting that, although American practice may be inconsistent, American rhetoric for universal values "has been remarkably consistent from Wilson to Bush"); Nigel Purvis, In
Defense of Universal Law: The Perspective of a Government Practitioner,92 Am Socy Intl L Proceedings 244 (1998) (documenting consistent support of universalism throughout the Clinton
administration).
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Although the United States endorsed universalism throughout
the past half-century, its position is increasingly challenged by the
growing international recognition of human rights related to sexual
orientation.8 United Nations treaty bodies and transnational tribunals
have issued numerous opinions recognizing sexual orientation rights
as universal human rights Human rights scholars have also spilled
much ink documenting the emergence of sexual orientation rights." In
the spring of 2003, Brazil introduced a resolution entitled "Sexual

Orientation and Human Rights" in the United Nations Commission
on Human Rights (UNCHR)." The resolution, which will reach a vote
in the spring of 2005,2 reaffirms the fact that existing human rights instruments protect sexual minorities."
While international institutions, such as the UN Human Rights
Committee, have declared the universality of sexual orientation rights,
the United States has not concurred. Instead, the United States asserts
culture-based arguments to justify laws that discriminate against sexual minorities. 4 By invoking culture to justify its nonrecognition of
sexual orientation rights, the United States is asserting a relativist position that conflicts with its historical endorsement of universal rights
that are defined by the UN human rights regime.
There exists a variety of rights associated with sexual orientation: equality rights, privacy
8
rights, freedom of expression, freedom of association, etc. For background on the numerous
rights related to sexual orientation, see generally Eric Heinze, Sexual Orientation:A Human
Right 153-286 (Martinus Nijhoff 1995). I will sometimes refer to these rights collectively as "sexual orientation rights."
See, for example, Young v Australia, UN GAOR Hum Rts Comm, 78th Sess, UN Doc
9
CCPR/Ci78/D/941/2000 (2000) (upholding the rights of same-sex domestic partners to receive
the same government benefits as heterosexual domestic partners); Lustig-Prean & Beckett v
United Kingdom, 29 Eur Ct HR 548 (2000) (voiding a ban on openly gay individuals serving in
the military); Toonen v Australia, UN GAOR Hum Rts Comm, 50th Sess, Supp No 40, vol 2, at
226, UN Doc A/49/40 (1994) (holding that a statute criminalizing homosexual conduct violated
the ICCPR); Dudgeon v United Kingdom, 45 Eur Ct HR 52 (1981) (holding that a ban on homosexual conduct violated the European Convention on Human Rights).
10 See, for example, Douglas Sanders, Human Rights and Sexual Orientationin International Law (2003), online at http://www.ai-lgbt.org/resourcesother.htm (visited Aug 16, 2004);
Michael Thomas, Note, Teetering on the Brink of Equality: Sexual Orientationand International
ConstitutionalProtection, 17 BC Third World L J 365 (1997); Laurence R. Heifer and Alice M.
Miller, Sexual Orientation and Human Rights: Toward a United States and TransnationalJurisprudence, 9 Harv Hum Rts J 61 (1996); James D. Wilets, The Human Rights of Sexual Minorities:
A Comparativeand International Law Perspective, 22 Hum Rts 22 (Fall 1995).
11 See Johann Hari, At Last the UN Recognises the Need for Gay Rights, Independent 17
(Apr 25,2003).
See United Nations Press Release No HR/CN/1086 (Apr 15, 2004), online at
12
http://www.un.orgNews/Press/docs/2004/hrcn1086.doc.htm (visited Aug 16, 2004) ("The Commission unanimously decided to postpone consideration of the draft resolution on human rights
and sexual orientation to its sixty-first session [in 2005].").
Hari, At Last the UN Recognises the Need for Gay Rights, Independent at 17 (cited in
13
note 11).
14 See Part Il1.
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As international sexual orientation rights continue to develop,
tension will grow between the United States's endorsement of universalism and its treatment of sexual orientation laws. While American
exceptionalism in foreign affairs may not be new," American exceptionalism based on cultural arguments is a recent development. This
Comment argues that American exceptionalism in sexual orientation
law carries unique transnational legal consequences because of its cultural basis. Scholars have asserted that exceptionalism generally decreases American credibility, thus diminishing American soft power."
However, with regard to sexual orientation rights, more is at stake: by
asserting cultural arguments regarding sexual orientation, the United
States risks legal consequences borne out in other areas of human
rights, such as women's rights and freedom of political expression.
This Comment is divided into four parts. Part I provides background on the debate over universalism and cultural relativism. Part II
provides background on the recognition of sexual orientation rights as
a universal human right. Part III discusses the United States's treatment of sexual orientation. Part IV discusses the legal consequences
of the tension between the American positions on universalism and
sexual orientation laws. Specifically, this Comment considers the doctrines of international estoppel and treaty suspension to show that, by
asserting cultural relativist arguments about sexual orientation, the
United States will likely jeopardize the international legal principles
that it fought hard to establish in other areas of human rights.
I. UNIVERSALISM VERSUS CULTURAL RELATIVISM

A. The Debate: Its History and Theoretical Underpinnings
Human rights are grounded in the notion that people, by virtue of
being human, have certain fundamental and inalienable rights.17 Under
the international human rights regime, states have an obligation to respect their citizens' human rights. Furthermore, the international
15 See Koh, 55 Stan L Rev at 1481 (cited in note 7). In this Comment, I adopt Koh's definition of exceptionalism, which includes all instances in which the United States promotes a double standard in international affairs. See id at 1483-87 ("[The] most problematic face of American exceptionalism [is] when the United States ...promote[s] a double standard ... propos[ing]
that a different rule should apply to itself than applies to the rest of the world."). By adopting
cultural relativism itself while condemning other states for their adoption of cultural relativism,
the United States promotes a double standard and is thus exercising exceptionalism.
16 See id at 1481, 1487. See also Joseph S. Nye, Jr., PropagandaIsn't the Way: Soft Power,
Intl Herald Trib 6 (Jan 10, 2003) ("Soft power is the ability to get what you want by attracting
and persuading others to adopt your goals."). Thus, soft power includes tools such as diplomacy,
whereas hard power includes the use of force.
17 See Robert D. Sloane, OutrelativizingRelativism: A Liberal Defense of the Universality
of InternationalHuman Rights, 34 Vand J Transnatl L 527,541-42 (2001).
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community has both a right and a responsibility to protest when a

state neglects this obligation."
1. Birth of the human rights regime and its universalist
assumption.
The international human rights regime emerged in the wake of

World War II. For most of history, international law governed only the
relationships between sovereign states.'9 However, the Nazi atrocities
of World War II prompted world leaders to believe that international
20
law should also address a state's mistreatment of its nationals. After

World War II, in 1945, the UN Charter created obligations requiring
member states to respect human rights2' and, in 1948, the General Assembly adopted the UDHR.2 Since then, the international community
has adopted numerous additional instruments to protect human
rights."
While states readily agree that human rights should be protected
by international law, the definition and scope of human rights remain

contested. One dimension of this debate concerns the universal versus

relative nature of rights.24 During the post-World War II human rights

movement, there was an underlying assumption that human rights are
universal;' that is to say, founders of the human rights regime believed
that a single standard should apply across the globe, transcending cul-

tural, social, and political lines. This is illustrated by the fact that the
18 See Richard B. Bilder, An Overview of InternationalHuman Rights Law, in Hurst Hannum, ed, Guide to International Human Rights Practice 3, 5-6 (Pennsylvania 2d ed 1992) (describing the emergence of this consensus after World War II).
19 See generally Louis Henkin, Intemational Law: Politics Values and Functions,216 Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of InternationalLaw: 1989 IV (Martinus Nijhoff 1990), reprinted in Steiner and Alston, InternationalHuman Rights 113 (cited in note 1).
20 See Bilder, An Overview of InternationalHuman Rights Law at 5 (cited in note 18).
UN Charter Art 1(3) (stating that the UN's purposes include "encouraging respect for
21
human rights").
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN General Assembly Res No 217A(III), UN
22
(1948).
A/810
Doc
23 For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the Convention Against Torture; the Genocide Convention; the Convention on Elimination of Racial Discrimination; the Convention on
the Rights of the Child; and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women.
See Steiner and Alston, InternationalHuman Rights at 192 ("One of the intense debates
24
in the human rights movement involves the 'universal' or 'relative' character, related to the 'absolute' or 'contingent' character, of the rights declared.").
25 See id at 187 (noting that instruments like the UDHR and ICCPR, which form the foundation of the human rights regime, "purport to give a genuinely universal expression to certain
tenets of liberal political culture").
See Guyora Binder, CulturalRelativism and Cultural Imperialism in Human Rights Law,
26
5 Buff Hum Rts L Rev 211,211 (1999) (noting that universalism assumes that human rights principles "transcend culture, society, and politics").
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bedrock of the international human rights regime lies in an instrument
called the UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights.
2. The relativist objection to human rights' Enlightenment roots.
Over the years, universalism has been challenged, primarily by
non-Western states. As non-Western states faced mounting criticism
for human rights violations, they began asserting culture-based defenses. Relativists reminded universalists that most non-Western states
did not participate in the drafting of the UDHR because, as subjects
of colonialism, they were not members of the UN.27 Thus, relativists argue that the human rights regime's assumption of universalism has a
cultural bias, favoring Western norms derived from Enlightenment-era
philosophy.
Although human rights became an integral component of international law only after 1945, most scholars trace the concept of human
rights to Enlightenment-era liberalism.9 Enlightenment philosophers
emphasized natural rights and natural law. Because these philosophers
stressed the power of human reasoning, natural rights focused on the
individual and the individual's right to life, liberty, and property.29 According to the premise of natural law, governments do not create
those rights; therefore, government's role is simply to enforce them. °
Critics of natural rights eventually pushed the notion into disfavor.31 Philosophers like Edmund Burke, David Hume, and Jeremy
Bentham argued that adopting natural law would lead to social upheaval because proclamations of natural rights could displace neces27 See Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Human Rights in the Muslim World: Socio-political
Conditions and ScripturalImperatives, 3 Harv Hum Rts J 13, 15 (1990). China also argued that it
was not adequately represented in the 1940s because the Chinese seat at the UN was held by
Chiang Kai-Shek's rebel regime, which China accused of pandering to its Western allies. See Ann
Kent, China, the United Nations, and Human Rights: The Limits of Compliance 40-41 (Pennsylvania 1999) (noting that China did not take over the UN seat from Chiang Kai-Shek until 1971
and, when doing so, China resisted conceding to the human rights obligations entered into by
Chiang's representatives).
28 See, for example, Sloane, 34 Vand J Transnatl L at 541-52 (cited in note 17) ("[T]he human rights tradition remains quintessentially a legacy of Western liberalism. It owes its conceptual origins to a unique Enlightenment-era synthesis of ... natural law and natural rights.");
Steiner and Alston, InternationalHuman Rights at 187 (cited in note 1) ("Observers from different regions and cultures can agree that the human rights movement, with respect to its language
of rights and the civil and political rights that it declares, stems principally from the liberal tradition of Western thought."); David Sidorsky, Contemporary Reinterpretationsof the Concept of
Human Rights, in David Sidorsky, ed, Essays on Human Rights: Contemporary Issues and Jewish
Perspectives 88, 89 (Jewish Publication Society 1979) ("This idea [behind human rights] has its
classic source in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century theories of natural rights.").
29 See Burns Weston, Human Rights, in 20 New Encyclopaedia Britannica 656 (15th ed
1992), reprinted in Steiner and Alston, InternationalHuman Rights 167, 167-68 (cited in note 1).
30 See Weston, Human Rights at 167-68 (cited in note 29).
31 Id at 169.
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sary legislation. 2 Although the concept of natural rights in its pure
form seemed impractical and antithetical to government, the postWorld War II human rights movement revived elements of natural
law. Human rights are grounded in the natural rights notion that indi33
viduals, by virtue of being human, have fundamental rights. Unlike
natural law, however, the human rights movement makes no ontological claim that such rights derive from a natural order. Also, the human
rights movement does not assert that the sole reason for government
is the enforcement of natural law.
This close relationship between the human rights movement and
Western liberal thought has led relativists to advocate alternative approaches." According to relativists, the existing universalist system
forces Western norms upon non-Western states that never underwent
the Enlightenment. Relativists liken universalism to colonization due
to its imposition of so-called Western values.3 For example, China argues that, unlike Enlightenment philosophy, which focuses on individual rights, Confucian tenets emphasize community and social authority: values that trump individual freedoms.3 In turn, China has relied
on "Chinese values" to justify its suppression of political dissidents.
Similarly, some African states use culture to justify female circumcision, 8 and many Muslim states cite the Koran to question universal
women's rights as they are defined by the UN treaty system."
3. The universalist defense.
As the cultural relativist movement gained momentum, many
scholars dismissed it as a pretext for oppression. The major defenses
of universalism can be categorized into three broad groups. First, contemporary Western philosophers of the Aristotelian and Kantian tradition, such as John Rawls and Martha Nussbaum, have made crossId.
See Sloane, 34 Vand J Transnatl L at 541-42 (cited in note 17); Sidorsky, Contemporary
Reinterpretationsof the Concept of Human Rights at 170 (cited in note 28).
See Steiner and Alston, InternationalHuman Rights at 187 (noting that the observation
34
that human rights stem from Western liberal thought "lies at the core of argument by states from
non-Western parts of the world that some basic provisions in [human rights] instruments ... are
inappropriate and inapplicable to their circumstances").
35
See Richard Klein, Cultural Relativism, Economic Development and InternationalHuman Rights in the Asian Context, 9 Touro Intl L Rev 1, 43 (2001) ("Some countries in Asia respond to western criticism of their human rights record by noting that memories of colonization
are very, very recent and very, very clear.").
See Joseph Chan, A Confucian Perspective on Human Rights for Contemporary China,
36
in Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel A. Bell, eds, The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights 212,
219-22 (Cambridge 1999); Davis, Chinese Perspectiveson Human Rights at 3-24 (cited in note 3).
37 See Davis, Chinese Perspectives on Human Rights at 9-12.
See Steiner and Alston, InternationalHuman Rights at 240-54 (cited in note 1).
38
39 See Mayer, 15 Mich J Intl Law at 329-33,360 (cited in note 2).
32
33
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cultural arguments for universalism. Rawls argues that society can

achieve an "overlapping consensus" among the world's comprehensive moral doctrines and that this overlapping consensus conforms to
political liberalism.4° Nussbaum builds on Rawls's theory by calling attention to human capabilities as a basis for consensus. Nussbaum has
used her "capabilities approach" to champion universal human rights,
particularly in the area of women's rights."
Second, scholars of non-Western intellectual thought have argued

that human rights definitions are still compatible with their native philosophies, despite their origins in Western liberalism. For instance, Islamic scholar Abdullahi An-Na'im argues that the Koran may be interpreted either to further the agendas of oppressive regimes or to

support a universalist understanding of human rights.41 Similar to
An-Na'im, Confucian scholars like Joseph Chan, Tu Weiming, and
Chung-ying Cheng have used Confucian texts to support universalism;

they argue that there is substantial convergence between Confucianism and political liberalism. 3
Finally, scholars have noted that culture is neither static nor
monolithic." Rather, there exists divergence within every major culture and those dynamics are fluid over time." Thus, states should not
ask for cultural exceptions to human rights laws. Instead, cultures
should evolve to accommodate human rights standards.

B.

The Debate: From Theory to Practice

The academic debate over the universality of human rights has
extended into the practice of international law. In the 1990s, cultural
relativism culminated in two notable international declarations: the
Cairo Declaration on Human Rights and the Bangkok Declaration on

40 See generally John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Harvard 1999); John Rawls, Political
Liberalism 133-72 (Columbia 1996).
41 See generally Martha C. Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice (Oxford 1999); Martha C.
Nussbaum and Jonathan Glover, eds, Women, Culture and Development:A Study of Human Capabilities(Oxford 1995).
42 An-Na'im, 3 Harv Hum Rts J at 15 (cited in note 27) ("Religious texts, like all other
texts, are open to a variety of interpretations. Human rights advocates in the Muslim world
should struggle to have their interpretations of the relevant texts adopted as the new Islamic
scriptural imperatives for the contemporary world.").
43
See Chan, A Confucian Perspective on Human Rights at 212-37 (cited in note 36); Tu
Weiming, Epilogue: Human Rights as a Confucian Moral Discourse, in Wm. Theodore de Bary
and Tu Weiming, eds, Confucianism and Human Rights 297 (Columbia 1998); Chung-ying Cheng,
Transforming Confucian Virtues into Human Rights: A Study of Human Agency and Potency in
Confucian Ethics,in de Bary and Weiming, eds, Confucianism and Human Rights 142.
44 See, for example, Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory & Practice86 (Cornell 2d ed 2003) ("[C]ultures are complex, variable, multivocal, and above all contested. Rather
than static things, 'cultures' are fluid complexes of intersubjective meanings and practices.").
45 Id.
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Human Rights. In these declarations, Islamic and Asian states, respec-

tively, banded together to proclaim that, although recognition of human rights is universal, the definition of such rights should be contextualized for culture."
Cultural relativist states have targeted certain human rights in
particular. First, these states have launched arguments against the universality of women's rights. This attack was evident at the negotiations
for CEDAW7' as well as the Cairo Convention on Population Control.4 Second, civil and political rights have been targeted by cultural

relativists. For example, China continues to assert that its suppression
of political dissidents is justified, if not necessitated, by Confucian traditions." China asserts this position at international conferences and
treaty negotiations whenever other states question China's human
rights record. 0
Despite the relativist attacks, Western nations in general, and the
United States in particular, have endorsed universalism. In negotiating
the UDHR, the ICCPR, CEDAW, and numerous bilateral treaties

such as those regarding grants of foreign aid, the United States asserted
its universalist approach. At the 1993 World Conference on Human
Rights, the United States called cultural relativism "the last refuge of

oppression."" Scholarly works have documented the consistent support
of universalism throughout the Clinton and Bush administrations.
46 For background on the Cairo Declaration, see Mayer, 15 Mich J Intl L at 327-29 (cited
in note 2) (noting that the Declaration reaffirmed Muslim states' commitment to fundamental
human rights but asserted "an Islamic countermodel of human rights"). For background on the
Bangkok Declaration, see Michael C. Davis, Human Rights in Asia: China and the Bangkok Declaration, 2 Buff J Intl L 215, 215-16 (1995-1996) (discussing how the Declaration challenged the
application of universalism in Asia).
47 See, for example, Lars Adam Reho Guide to the Travaux Prparatoires of the United
Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discriminationagainst Women 60 (Martinus Nijhoff 1993) (noting that Morocco proposed an amendment to Article 2 to accommodate
Muslim practice).
48 See Joel Richard Paul, CulturalResistance to Global Governance, 22 Mich J Intl L 1, 16
(2000) (noting that religious states, namely Muslim states and the Vatican, opposed women's reproductive rights).
49 See Davis, Chinese Perspectiveson Human Rights at 11-12 (cited in note 3) ("While continuing to crack down hard on dissidents and labour activists, as well as journalists, the government has demonstrated an increasing tendency to attempt to justify its policies ... in official human rights policy pronouncements, such as ... the Bangkok Declaration.").
50 For example, in its policy statement at the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights,
China asserted its interpretation of Confucianism by stating: "Nobody shall place his own rights
and interests above those of the state and society, nor should he be allowed to impair those of
others and the general public." Statement by Liu Huaqui, Head of the Chinese Delegation, in
Stephen C. Angle and Marina Svensson, eds, The Chinese Human Rights Reader: Documents and
Commentary 1900-2000 390,393 (M.E. Sharpe 2001).
51 Sciolino, US Rejects Notion That Human Rights Vary with Culture, NY Times at Al
(cited in note 6).
52
See note 7. One should note that some scholars have highlighted the United States's
uses of federalism and capitalism to raise treaty reservations, likening those reservations to cul-
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To this day, states continue to debate universalism and cultural

relativism. 3 However, through the lobbying of powerful states such as
the United States, universalism continues to underpin the legal structure of many human rights issues, such as women's rights and freedom
of political expression.
CEDAW condemns the application of cultural relativism to
women's rights; its provisions are resoundingly universalist.6' Despite
opposition from Muslim states, the final version of CEDAW includes

Articles 2(f) and 5(a), which require all states to modify customary
and cultural practices that discriminate against women.5 When signing
CEDAW, several Muslim states-including Bangladesh, Egypt, Iraq,
and Saudi Arabia-entered reservations refusing to accept articles

they deemed incompatible with Islamic Shariah, the Koran-based
code of law. However, numerous states and scholars have concluded

that those reservations are invalid because, according to the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, reservations may not circumvent

the main purpose of a treaty.5 Furthermore, CEDAW illustrates that
the opinio juris component of customary international law has been

established with regard to the universal protection of women's rights.6
tural exceptions. Regarding federalism, see Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Reflections on the Proposed
United States Reservations to CEDAW"Should the Constitution Be an Obstacle to Human Rights?,
23 Hastings Const L 0 727,739 (1996). Regarding capitalism, see Catherine Powell, Introduction:
Locating Culture, Identity, and Human Rights, 30 Colum Intl L Rev 201,205 (1999). For the purposes of this Comment, those reservations will be distinguished from cultural relativist claims
because, unlike the cultural claims addressed in this Comment, they do not derive from moral
doctrines such as Islam, Confucianism, or Christianity. For more discussion on the uniqueness of
the United States's application of cultural relativism to sexual orientation issues, see note 94 and
accompanying text.
53 See generally Steiner and Alston, International Human Rights at 166-225 (cited in
note 1).
54 Id.
55
UN General Assembly Res No 34/180, UN Doc A/RES/34/180 (1979).
56
These reservations are available online at http://untreaty.un.orglENGLISHIbible/
englishinternetbible/partl/chapterlV/treatylo.asp (visited Aug 16,2004).
57
For example, Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, and the Netherlands
all filed official objections against Saudi Arabia's reservation as inadmissible. See id. For scholarly publications concluding that the Muslim reservations are invalid, see Jo Lyn Southard, Protection of Women's Human Rights under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of DiscriminationAgainst Women, 8 Pace Intl L Rev 1, 21 (1996); Belinda Clark, The Vienna Convention Reservations Regime and the Convention on DiscriminationAgainst Women, 85 Am J Intl L
281-320 (1991).
58 See Southard, 8 Pace Intl L Rev at 22 (cited in note 57) (concluding that "the so-called
psychological component-opinio juris-of customary law is fulfilled by CEDAW"). Opiniojuris
is one of two components of customary international law, the second being usage. For background on customary international law, see Barry E. Carter and Philip R. Trimble, eds, International Law 134-46 (Aspen 3ded 1999).
One should note that, although the United States has yet to ratify CEDAW, as a signatory
the United States is still obligated not to act in a manner that would defeat the object and purpose of that treaty. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§ 312(3) (1987).
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Freedom of political expression is similarly grounded in universal
terms. The ICCPR does not recognize cultural exceptions. Signatories
to the ICCPR, including China, are thus held to its universal obligations.59 Even states that have not signed the ICCPR can be held accountable to the ICCPR's universal terms because most of the
ICCPR's provisions are now regarded as customary international
law.6° Accordingly, the United States legitimately enforces the universal right to political expression through bilateral treaties, in which it
offers development assistance to foreign states, conditional on compliance with the ICCPR's universalist terms. 6' As a further indication of
cultural relativism's inapplicability to political expression, one should
note that there is a case pending in the Southern District of New York,
brought under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), alleging that Chinese Premier Li Peng violated Tiananmen Square protesters' rights to
peaceful assembly and association.u It is doubtful that the court will
interpret expressive rights as being relative to Chinese culture.
The current legal infrastructures of women's human rights and
the right to political expression illustrate that the scale between cultural relativism and universalism currently weighs in favor of universalism. The status quo, however, is a delicate one. As Part IV of this
Comment will show, the United States's posture on sexual orientation
increasingly lends weight to relativism, jeopardizing, inter alia, universal women's rights and universal rights to political expression.
II. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Over the past decade, universal human rights related to sexual
orientation emerged. At the outset, I should note that recognition of
sexual orientation rights is still developing. The contours of sexual orientation rights are unclear. Indeed, there is no human rights treaty
China has signed but not ratified the ICCPR.
See General Comment No 24, UN GAOR Human Rights Committee, 52d Session, UN
8 (1994) (listing ICCPR provisions that qualify as customary
Doc CCPR/C/21/Revl/Add6
law). See also Nicole Fritz and Martin Flaherty, Unjust Order: Malaysia's Internal Security Act, 26
Fordham Intl L J 1345, 1371-72 (2003) ("[T]he ICCPR has met with such consistent endorsement and compliance that many of its provisions are now said to reflect customary international
law.").
61 For general background on enforcement of human rights standards through conditional
development assistance, see Steiner and Alston, InternationalHuman Rights at 811-61 (cited in
note 1).
62
See Complaint, Zhou v Peng,No. 00 Civ 6446, $ 65 (SD NY filed Aug 28,2000), online at
http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legallhuman-rights/docs/Complaint-Feng-Suo_- Zhou.pdf (visited Aug
16,2004). Although the court held in September 2003 that plaintiffs' mode of service to Li Peng
was unconstitutional, Zhou v Peng, 286 F Supp 2d 255 (SD NY 2003), plaintiffs' counsel announced in a press release that they were preparing to challenge that decision and proceed with
the case. See Press Release, Feng Suo Zhou v Li Peng, online at http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legall
human-rights/rightsArticle.asp?ObjlD=ld9daNyMoA&Content=185 (visited Aug 16,2004).
59

60
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with the words "sexual orientation" in its title, nor any treaty that specifically delineates sexual orientation rights. Furthermore, like
women's rights, sexual orientation rights have yet to achieve the status
of international customary law;6 numerous states, including the
United States, still refuse to fully extend human rights protections to
sexual minorities.Despite these facts, however, UN treaty bodies and transnational
tribunals have declared that sexual minorities are protected by existing human rights treaties such as the ICCPR. That is to say, at least according to international institutions such as the UN, sexual orientation
rights fall within the scope of existing treaties and, accordingly, states
are obligated to respect those rights. According to mainstream international law, when treaty and customary law are unclear, international
court decisions and the writings of international jurists serve as a subsidiary source of law." Thus, statements from the UN system and opinions from human rights tribunals serve as a subsidiary source of law.
Furthermore, international lawyers give great deference to UN treaty
bodies' interpretation of human rights treaties." Thus, many human
rights scholars believe that a body of international law has begun to
amass that protects sexual orientation rights.67 Moreover, national
practices around the world have begun to evolve, thus generating new
human rights norms related to sexual orientation.6
Because the emergence of international sexual orientation rights
has already been extensively documented by other scholars, this Part
will provide an abbreviated account of this movement by highlighting
63 One should note that, although women's human rights have not yet attained the status
of customary law, they have achieved the opiniojuris component of international customary law.
See note 58 and accompanying text.
64 See Donnelly, Universal Human Rights at 225-41 (cited in note 44) (noting that, internationally, discrimination against sexual minorities is still widespread and deep).
65 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art 38(1)(d), 59 Stat 1055, 1060, Treaty
Serial No 933 (1945) (listing subsidiary sources of international law); Diane P Wood, Diffusion
and Focus in InternationalLaw Scholarship, 1 Chi J Intl L 141,143 (2000) ("Public international
lawyers point to Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice ('ICJ') for the definitive list of [ ] sources [of international law].").
66 See Deana Pollard, Banning Child Corporal Punishment, 77 Tulane L Rev 575, 592
(2003) (noting that the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child "issues authoritative interpretations" of the Convention on the Rights of the Child); Onuma Yasuaki, Is the International
Court of Justice an Emperor without Clothes?, 8 Intl Legal Theory 1, 26 (2002) (arguing that customary law "is far inferior to that of the general international law-creating process based on multinational treaties of a universal nature or UN declarations"); Heifer and Miller, 9 Harv Hum
Rts J at 77 n 77 (cited in note 10) (noting that "the [UN Human Rights] Committee's 'views' are
not legally binding but rather a stronglypersuasive interpretationof the ICCPR, which is binding
on State Parties") (emphasis altered). But see Jack Goldsmith, Should International Human
Rights Law Trump US Domestic Law?, 1 Chi J Intl L 327,331 (2000) (noting that the UN Human
Rights Committee "does not have official judicial or enforcement authority").
67
See note 10.
68 See text accompanying notes 87-91.
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landmark occasions and noteworthy trends from the past decade. Specifically, this Part will look at transnational case law, statements issued
by UN treaty bodies, the agendas of UN subgroups and international
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), evolving national practices,
and the UNCHR's pending resolution, "Human Rights and Sexual
Orientation."
Among numerous cases that cite international law to protect sexual orientation rights, three are particularly worth discussing: Toonen
v Australia,6' Young v Australia,"and Lustig-Prean & Beckett v United
Kingdom.' The UN Human Rights Committee decided Toonen in
1994. In that case, Nicholas Toonen, a gay rights activist, challenged
Tasmania's prohibition on homosexual activity. The Committee held

that the Tasmanian legislation violated human rights pursuant to the
ICCPR. Toonen is noteworthy because, through Toonen's interpreta-

tion of the ICCPR, the UN Human Rights Committee declared that
every signatory of the ICCPR has human rights obligations with regard to sexual orientation.72 Toonen stands for the fact that, although

the ICCPR does not expressly mention sexual orientation, sexual orientation rights are embedded in the treaty's language.
The Committee found in favor of Toonen on two grounds: (1) privacy rights, pursuant to Article 17;" and (2) nondiscrimination rights,
pursuant to Article 26. The ICCPR does not expressly prohibit sexual

orientation discrimination; Article 26 prohibits discrimination "on any
ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status."'"
However, the Committee found that the ICCPR covered sexual orientation because, "in [the Committee's view] the reference to 'sex' ... is
to be taken as including sexual orientation.""6
Toonen is additionally noteworthy because it expressly dismissed

cultural relativism. Tasmania argued against extending privacy rights
to same-sex couples because of Tasmania's local moral culture." The
69

UN GAOR Hum Rts Comm, 49th Sess, Supp No 40, vol 2, at 226, UN Doc A/49/40

(1994).
UN GAOR Hum Rts Comm, 78th Sess, UN Doc CCPR/C/78/D/941t2000 (2000).
29 Eur Ct HR 548 (2000).
72
If a state has signed a treaty, even if it has not ratified the treaty, it is obligated under international law not to act in a manner that would defeat the object and purpose of that treaty.
See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 312(3) (1987).
73 Toonen v Australia,Supp No 40, vol2, 8.6 at 234.
74 Id $ 8.7 at 234.
75 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art 26, UNGA Res 2200A (XXI),
999 UNTS 171 (Dec 19, 1966, entered into force Mar 23,1976).
76 Toonen, Supp No 40, vol 2, 9 8.6 at 234. For criticism of the Committee's decision to have
"sex" include "sexual orientation," see Anna Funder, The Toonen Case, 5 Pub L Rev 156, 159
(1994).
77
See Sanders, Human Rights and Sexual Orientationat 20 (cited in note 10).
70

71
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Committee responded: "[We] cannot accept that for the purposes of
article 17 of the Covenant, moral issues are exclusively a matter of
domestic concern."' 8
Young is another particularly noteworthy case from the UN Human Rights Committee. While Toonen recognized sexual orientation
rights by decriminalizing same-sex activity, Young elevated sexual ori-

entation from an issue of criminality to an issue of equal opportunity.
In Young, the Human Rights Committee held that Young was entitled

to a government pension because of his status as the same-sex partner
of an Australian veteran." The Committee noted that, pursuant to Article 26 of the ICCPR, Australia had no legitimate reason for denying

same-sex domestic partners government benefits that were offered to
heterosexual partners.8'
Lustig-Prean,which was decided by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in 1999, is also worth noting because it dealt with
a subject that has been particularly controversial in the United States:
gays in the military. In Lustig-Prean, the ECHR held that the United
Kingdom's ban on gays in the military violated the European Convention on Human Rights.8' Although the ECHR is a regional tribunal,
the ECHR's decision in Lustig-Prean is nonetheless noteworthy be-

cause various non-European national courts around the world cite to
the ECHR as persuasive authority on human rights norms.0 Professor
John Attanasio has noted that "the ECHR may be becoming a sort of
world court of human rights."'
The emergence of sexual orientation rights is not confined to case
law. After the UN Human Rights Committee decided in Toonen that
the ICCPR protects sexual minorities, four other UN Committees de-

clared that they also interpret their respective treaties-the ICESCR,
Toonen, Supp No 40, vol 2,9 8.6 at 234.
UN GAOR Hum Rts Comm, 78th Sess, UN Doc CCPR/C/78/D/941/2000 at
11 10-12.
80
Id.
81 29 Eur Ct HR at 548.
82 See, for example, Carl Bruch, Wole Coker, and Chris VanArsdale, ConstitutionalEnvironmental Law: Giving Force to FundamentalPrinciplesin Africa, 26 Colum J Envir L 131,140
(2001) (noting that the Zambian Supreme Court cited to the ECHR); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 Va J Intl L 1103, 1110 (2000) (noting that the South African Supreme
Court, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, the Constitutional Court of Jamaica, and the InterAmerican Human Rights Commission have all cited to the ECHR); John B. Attanasio, Rapporteur's Overview and Conclusions: Of Sovereignty, Globalization,and Courts, 28 NYU J Intl L &
Polit 1, 16 (1995-1996) (noting that Australia, Canada, and New Zealand cite to the ECHR). The
Supreme Court has also cited to the ECHR. See Lawrence v Texas, 539 US 558,573 (2003), citing
Dudgeon v United Kingdom,45 Eur Ct HR T 52 (1981).
83
Attanasio, 28 NYU J Intl L & Polit at 16 (cited in note 82). See also Slaughter, 40 Va J
Intl L at 1109 (cited in note 82) ("Beyond Europe, the ECHR has become a source of authoritative pronouncements on human rights law for national courts that are not directly subject to its
authority.").
78

79
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CEDAW, the Convention Against Torture, and the Convention on the
Rights of the Child -to protect sexual minorities. ' Thus, according to
UN treaty bodies, all signatories to the aforementioned treaties hold
human rights obligations with regard to sexual orientation.
The overarching agendas of UN subgroups and international
NGOs illustrate the growing role of sexual orientation in human
rights monitoring. For example, six of the UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights' Special Rapporteurs now include sexual orientation in
their agendas." Major nongovernmental human rights monitors, such
as Amnesty International, also include sexual orientation in their
agendas. Previously, Amnesty International limited its sexual orientation work to cases of imprisonment, torture, and violence. Since 2001,
however, Amnesty International's mandate has expanded to include
all forms of discrimination based on sexual orientation.
Evolving national practices, particularly in Europe, also illustrate
the growing recognition of sexual orientation as a human right. European states lead the world in sexual orientation law reform. For example, in 1994, the European Parliament called upon the Commission
of the European Community to recommend that member states terminate "the barring of lesbians and homosexual couples from marriage or from an equivalent legal framework ...[and] any restriction
on the right of lesbians and homosexuals to be parents or to adopt or
foster children."8' The European Union has also declared that respect

for sexual orientation rights is a prerequisite for states that join the
European Union through its enlargement process.In a statement of interpretation regarding health care, the UN Committee on Economic,
84
Social and Cultural Rights declared that Article 2(2) of the ICESCR proscribes discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation. CESR General Comment No 14, UN Doc E/C.12/2000/4 Art
12, 18 (Aug 11, 2000). Pursuant to CEDAW, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women has called for the decriminalization of lesbianism. See, for example,
Concluding Observationsof the Committee on the Eliminationof DiscriminationAgainst Women:
Kyrgyzstan, UN Doc CEDAW/A/54/38 $$ 127-28 (Jan 27, 1999). Pursuant to the Convention
Against Torture, the UN Committee on Torture has issued declarations criticizing states for
prison conditions that discriminate based on sexual orientation. See, for example, Concluding
Observations of the Committee Against Torture:Egypt, UN Doc CAT/s/XXIXIMisc.4 T 5(e) (Nov
20, 2002). The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has interpreted Article 2 of the Convention on the Rights of Children as barring disparity between heterosexual and homosexual
couples' ages of consent. See, for example, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the
Rights of the Child: (Isle of Man) United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,UN
Doc CRC/C/15/Add.134 22 (Oct 16,2000).
See Sanders, Human Rights and Sexual Orientationat 25 (cited in note 10).
85
86 See id at 35.
87 James D. Wilets, ConceptualizingPrivate Violence against Sexual Minorities as Gendered
Violence: An Internationaland ComparativeLaw Perspective,60 Albany L Rev 989, 1036 (1997)
(quoting the Commission of the European Community).
88 See generally Travis J. Langenkamp, Comment, Finding FundamentalFairness: Protecting the Rights of Homosexuals under European Union Accession Law, 4 San Diego Intl L J 437
(2003).
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The development of national sexual orientation rights is not limited to Europe. States across the world have increasingly protected
sexual minorities under either existing nondiscrimination laws or
newly enacted laws expressly prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination. South Africa, Ecuador, and Fiji exemplify this trend; all three
of these non-European states have modified their national constitutions to explicitly prohibit discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation.9 In another example, Canada legalized same-sex marriages
in the summer of 2003.' Legislation to legalize same-sex marriage is

pending in other nations, including Asian and Latin American states
such as Taiwan and Chile.91

Last spring, Brazil introduced the UNCHR resolution, "Sexual
Orientation and Human Rights." The resolution did not create any
new substantive rights but instead codified the recognition that "the
universal nature of [human rights] is beyond question and that the enjoyment of such rights and freedoms should not be hindered in any
way on the grounds of sexual orientation." The resolution is sched-

uled to reach a vote in the spring of 2005.9'
III. THE AMERICAN POSITION ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION
In comparison to these international trends, the United States has

been slow to extend basic human rights to sexual minorities. In fact,
the UN Human Rights Committee has criticized the United States's
sexual orientation laws as infringing on human rights protected by the
ICCPR.' In the United States, the premise for withholding civil and
See Sanders, Human Rights and Sexual Orientationat 35-36.
90 See DeNeen L. Brown, Canada'sParliament Endorses Gay Marriage:Narrow Defeat of
Motion on TraditionalMatrimony UnderscoresNationalDivide,Wash Post A23 (Sept 17, 2003).
91 See Paul Wiseman, Same-Sex Marriage Spurs Few PoliticalRipples in Taiwan, Seattle
89

Times A10 (Feb 27, 2004) (discussing the pending Taiwanese legislation, noting that Argentina
and Brazil have extended some marriage rights to same-sex couples, and noting that similar legislation is being considered in Chile); Debby Wu, Foreigners Praise Taiwan's Planned Human
Rights Law, Taipei Times 2 (Nov 19,2003) (discussing the pending legislation in Taiwan).
92 Sanders, Human Rights and Sexual Orientation at 30 (cited in note 10) (quoting the proposed resolution).
93 See note 12 and accompanying text.
94

See Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: United States of America,

UN Doc CCPR/C/79/Add.50 287 (Oct 30,1995) (noting as a "subject of concern" the "serious
infringement of private life in some states [of the United States] which classify as a criminal offence sexual relations between adult consenting partners of the same sex carried out in private,
and the consequences thereof for their enjoyment of other human rights without discrimination"). Although this report specifically addressed American sodomy laws before Lawrence v
Texas, 539 US 558 (2003), its interpretation of the ICCPR can be adopted to criticize other aspects of American sexual orientation laws. Human rights scholars such as Mary Robinson and
Harold Hongju Koh have cited this report to argue that the United States has violated its obligations pursuant to the ICCPR. See Brief of Amici Curiae Mary Robinson, et al, Lawrence v Texas,
No 02-102,12 n 16 (filed Jan 16,2003) (available on Westlaw at 2003 WL 164151).
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social rights from sexual minorities is usually culture-based, drawing
from a particular brand of Judeo-Christian norms. This cultural relativism is evident in the United States's treatment of sexual orientation
in national practice as well as in its foreign relations.
A. Cultural Relativism in National Practice
The United States's national laws regarding sexual orientation
seem to be diverging from international trends. Over the past decade,
other states have been extending civil rights-such as partnership
rights9 and the right to serve in the military" - to sexual minorities out
of a sense of human rights obligations. Meanwhile, the United States
has passed laws to explicitly limit those rights. The justification for
these national practices is usually culture-based. Although the United
States has made no express declaration endorsing cultural relativism,
its national practice suffices to articulate a cultural relativist position
on sexual orientation." This Part discusses evidence of the United
States's national practice.
In 1996, Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act 8
(DOMA), which sought to bar same-sex marriage by defining marriage as "only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife."" The enactment of DOMA illustrates the United
States's cultural relativist position on sexual orientation rights. The
House Report for DOMA explains that the Act was a direct response
to growing support for same-sex marriages ' o' and that DOMA was

necessary because "there is to this issue of marriage an overtly moral
or religious aspect that cannot be divorced from the practicalities.'.' °
The report then explained that heterosexual marriage better comports
with Judeo-Christian norms, citing a study that found that "the Jewish
and Christian traditions have, in a clear and sustained manner, judged
homosexual behavior to be morally wrong. ' 02

See text accompanying notes 87,90-91.
See Michael Kirby, Law and Sexuality: The Contrasting Case of Australia, 12 Stan L &
Policy Rev 103, 106-08 (2001) (noting that Australia has extended the right of military service to
gays, at least partly because of international human rights considerations, and suggesting that the
United States is lagging behind in reform).
97 Consider Military and ParamilitaryActivities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v
United States), 1984 ICJ 392, 415 (equating conduct with express declarations for the purpose of
an estoppel claim).
98 Pub L No 104-199, 110 Stat 2419 (1996), codified at 1 USC § 7 (2000) and 28 USC
§ 1738C (2000).
99 1USC § 7.
100 HR Rep No 104-664, 104th Cong, 2d Sess 2 (1996). reprinted in 1996 USCCAN 2905.
101 Id at 15.
102 Id at 16 n 54.
95

96
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The government's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, 3 which bans
openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual people from military service, is another manifestation of cultural arguments against sexual minorities.
When President Clinton signed "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," many observers labeled the policy as a compromise between sexual orientation
rights and particular Christian values."" The bill itself does not cite religious norms; however, it stresses that the policy is necessary for
military "morale."'05 When asked why allowing sexual minorities to
serve in the military would compromise morale, supporters of the ban
cited cultural norms, noting that "heterosexual soldiers do not like gay
soldiers."'"4
Evidence of relativism in American law is not confined to legislation. Jurisprudence regarding custodial rights of nonheterosexuals also
serves as an example of cultural relativism. Although there is a trend
in family courts not to consider sexual orientation when assessing an
individual's fitness for custodial or adoption rights,'° many courts still
find an individual unfit solely because he or she is not heterosexual,
and offer Judeo-Christian norms to explain why."'
The United States's relativist position is perhaps most clearly evident in recent presidential statements regarding marriage. For example, on February 24, 2004, President Bush discussed his proposed Federal Marriage Amendment (FMA), which would render legal recogni0 4 Bush
tion of same-sex marriages unconstitutional.'
promoted the
Pub L No 103-160,107 Stat 1670 (1993), codified at 10 USC § 654 (2000).
See, for example, Backpedaling from His Campaign Promise to Lift the Gay Ban in the
Military, Post-Standard (Syracuse, NY) (July 20, 1993) (characterizing the "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" policy as a compromise); Peter Applebome, Gay Issue Mobilizes Conservatives against Clinton, NY Times A14 (Feb 1,1993) (describing pressure from Christian lobbyists on President Clinton to reach a compromise).
105 10 USC § 654(a)(6), (15).
106 Aaron Belkin, Don't Ask, Don't Tell: Is the Gay Ban Based on Military Necessity?, Parameters 108, 117 (Summer 2003) ("[S]upporters of the ban point to numerous statistical surveys
showing that heterosexual soldiers do not like gay soldiers."). It is worth noting that, cultural arguments aside, it is unclear that an argument of military necessity justifies depriving sexual minorities of the right to serve. In fact, in Lustig-Prean,the ECHR expressly stated that "necessity"
arguments did not justify the United Kingdom's ban on sexual minorities in the military. 29 Eur
Ct HR at 548.
107 See Kate Kendell, Lesbian and Gay Parentsin Child Custody and Visitation Disputes,30
Hum Rts 8, 8 (Summer 2003) (noting that, over the years, many family courts have rejected
"categorical assumptions based on a parent's sexual orientation").
108 See, for example, Lofton v Kearney, 157 F Supp 2d 1372 (SD Fla 2001) (denying adoption rights on the basis of sexual orientation); Kendell, 30 Hum Rts at 8, 22 (cited in note 107)
(listing cases in which custodial rights were denied because of sexual orientation considerations).
See also Ex Parte H.H., 830 S2d 21, 26 (Ala 2002) (Moore concurring) ("[H]omosexual conduct
of a parent ... creates a strong presumption of unfitness ....
Homosexual conduct is ...a violation of the laws of nature and of nature's God.").
109 See George W. Bush, President Calls for ConstitutionalAmendment ProtectingMarriage:
Remarks by the President (Feb 24, 2004), online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2004/02/20040224-2.html (visited Aug 16,2004).
103
104
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FMA by stating, "Marriage cannot be severed from its cultural, religious and natural roots.", 0 In another official press briefing on the
same day, Press Secretary Scott McClellan discussed the FMA and
confirmed that President Bush consulted theologians in formulating
the FMA." McClellan also supported the FMA by noting that marriage is "sacred. '"2 When a reporter asked, "Is [the FMA] purely based
on [the President's] religious faith?" McClellan responded, "[I]t's
based on his long-held belief... 3 Also, in an earlier press conference on
July 30, 2003, Bush implied that homosexuality is a sin."' These statements from White House press conferences are particularly noteworthy because, as Part IV will discuss, such press conferences serve evidentiary purposes under international law.
B.

Cultural Relativism in Foreign Relations

Because sexual orientation rights have only recently emerged in
the international context, American treatment of the issue in foreign
relations is limited. However, on those few occasions, the United
States has opposed the extension of sexual orientation rights due to
cultural differences. For example, in the spring of 2003, the United
States refused to support the resolution proposed by Brazil entitled
"Sexual Orientation and Human Rights." When pressed to explain,
State Department spokesperson Richard Boucher stated that the
United States would not support a resolution on sexual orientation
that required "some sort of universal application throughout the
[American legal] system."''.
Boucher's statement appears indicative of the United States's
opposition to universalism regarding sexual orientation. Boucher's
comment may have been motivated in part by federalism since he
noted that sexual orientation issues are often addressed at the local
level."' However, Boucher conceded that antidiscrimination laws do
110 Id.
111 See Scott McClellan, Press Briefing (Feb 24, 2004), online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2004/02/20040224-5.html (visited Aug 16,2004).
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 In addressing sexual orientation issues at the press conference, President Bush prefaced
by stating that he was "mindful that we are all sinners"; commentators have interpreted his remarks as a condemnation of homosexuality. See Dick Polman, Gay-MarriageIssue Puts Bush at
Odds with Himself,Philadelphia Inquirer C01 (Nov 30,2003); Pam Lobley, We'll Recoil in Shame
20 Years from Now, Chi Trib C19 (Aug 19,2003); Regarding Sinners: The President's Comments
on Gays, Record (NJ) L06 (Aug 1,2003). See also President Bush Discusses Top Prioritiesfor the
US. (press conference transcript) (July 30, 2003), online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases2003/07/20030730-1.html (visited Aug 16,2004).
115 Richard Boucher, Daily Press Briefing (Apr 25, 2003), online at http://www.state.gov/r/
pa/prs/dpb2003/19959.htm (visited Aug 16,2004) (emphasis added).
116 Id.
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exist on the federal level."' Furthermore, other rights related to sexual
orientation-freedoms of privacy, expression, and association-are
protected on a federal level. In light of the lobbying from conservative
religious groups, one can conclude that cultural relativism played a
role in the State Department's rejection of the Brazilian resolution's
universalist nature. 1
Another example of American cultural relativism lies in the
American opposition to accrediting gay rights NGOs to the UN system."' Americans such as Senator Jesse Helms have actively lobbied
the international community against accrediting NGOs such as the International Gay and Lesbian Association. To justify his opposition, the
senator criticized the moral composition of such groups.
C. Flirting with Universalism and the Relativist Response
Although this Part has primarily served to highlight religious and
cultural arguments made by the United States against sexual minorities, one should note that sexual orientation rights have in fact progressed in the United States. In the 2003 case of Lawrence v Texas, 2'
for example, the Supreme Court ruled that Texas's criminalization of
sodomy was unconstitutional. In his majority opinion, Justice Kennedy
cited both the ECHR and an amicus brief filed by human rights advocates to argue in favor of sexual orientation rights.' In another 2003
case, Goodridge v Departmentof Health," the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court held that the state's denial of marriage licenses to
same-sex couples was unconstitutional. The plaintiffs' attorney characterized the decision as a win for human rights, noting that "this really
is an issue about human equality and human dignity.'' .
Yet, cultural arguments against sexual minorities persist. In the
wake of Lawrence and Goodridge, cultural arguments surged in a
wave of backlash. For example, in an official White House press release, President Bush joined a coalition of twenty-five Christian

Id.
Religious organizations have lobbied the federal government not to endorse the Brazilian resolution. See Austin Ruse, Demand U.N.and Powell Stop Homosexual Ploy Now (May 2,
2003), online at http://www.conservativepetitions.com/petitions.php?id=190 (visited Aug 16,
2004) (urging American religious organizations to lobby against the resolution).
119 See Douglas Sanders, Getting Lesbian and Gay Issues on the InternationalHuman Rights
Agenda, 18 Hum Rts 0 67,97-103 (1996).
120 See id at 100.
121 539 US 558 (2003).
122 Id at 573, citing Dudgeon, 45 Eur Ct HR
52; 539 US at 576-77, citing Brief of Arnici
Curiae Mary Robinson, et al (cited in note 94).
123 440 Mass 309,798 NE2d 941 (2003).
124 Lawyer in Same Sex Marriage Case Applauds Decision (Nov 18, 2003), online at
http://www.cnn.comrTRANSCRIPTS/0311/18/se.01.html (visited Aug 16,2004).
117
118
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organizations to proclaim that the week of October 12-18, 2003,
would officially be recognized as "Marriage Protection Week..'. Marriage Protection Week sought to preserve a particular Christian notion
that marriage can only be "a union between a man and a woman. '26
At present, the trajectory of the American position on sexual orientation rights is unclear. As the United States charts its course in
dealing with sexual orientation, there will be consequences arising
from the United States's decisions. The following Part discusses the
consequences that might arise should the United States continue employing cultural arguments against the recognition of sexual orientation rights.
IV.

LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE AMERICAN POSITION

By asserting cultural arguments to restrict the human rights of
sexual minorities, while international institutions declare sexual orientation rights to be universal, the United States is employing cultural
relativism. If the United States continues to invoke culture to justify
its discriminatory practices, it aligns itself with the cultural relativists
that signed the Cairo and Bangkok Declarations.
By using religion to justify its sexual orientation laws, the United
States is essentially saying that, while it recognizes the international
human rights regime, sexual minorities' human rights should be contextualized for culture, in this case American Christianity. That argument is analogous to Islamic states' argument that women's human
rights should be contextualized for Muslim culture and Asian states'
argument that an individual's human rights should be contextualized
for Confucian culture. Although the universalism-versus-relativism
debate largely hinged on East-West differences in the past, the United
States is nonetheless asserting cultural relativism when it excuses itself
from human rights norms by asserting its particular brand of JudeoChristian mores.
The United States creates a double standard by resorting to cultural relativism on sexual orientation rights. In his article, On American Exceptionalism, Harold Hongju Koh notes that double standards
are a type of exceptionalism that is not new to American foreign policy."' What are the consequences of such American exceptionalism?
Scholars have asserted that American exceptionalism compromises
the United States's soft powers. By reducing American credibility,
125 See Jim Remsen, Week of Events in Opposition to Same-Sex Vows, Philadelphia Inquirer
A07 (Oct 12,2003).
126 George W. Bush, Marriage Protection Week, 2003: A Proclamation (Oct 3, 2003), online
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/newslreleasesl2003/10120031003-12.html (visited Aug 16,2004).
127 Koh, 55 Stan L Rev at 1481 (cited in note 7).
128 See id at 1487. But see Goldsmith, 1 Chi J Intl L at 338 (cited in note 66) (defending
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exceptionalism compromises the United States's soft power to conduct diplomacy. There has been a trend, however, among human rights
scholars and practitioners to look beyond these soft effects to the

transnational legal consequences of American exceptionalism. For example, human rights advocates have challenged the American treatment of Guantanamo Bay detainees through litigation in American
courts, ' British courts, 4 and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.'
Human rights practitioners have increasingly used legal tools to
address human rights issues instead of relying only on lobbying powers. Many of these legal tools have been characterized as innovative,
sometimes too much so. For example, Belgium's attempt to use universal jurisdiction to prosecute Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon
and U.S. General Tommy Franks for human rights violations has been
criticized as an example of legal innovation stretched too thin.' 2 However, lawyers' use of the ATCA to enforce human rights law is a legal
innovation that has now become a common practice.'
In this Part, I look at international estoppel and treaty suspension
as legal tools that foreign states may innovatively, but legitimately, use
to impose detrimental consequences on the United States for its double standard on cultural relativism. Although international estoppel
and treaty suspension are rarely invoked, they are both doctrines that
are firmly rooted in international law. In the past, these doctrines have
not been invoked to deal with the United States's human rights record
because, until the sexual orientation issue emerged, the United States
has never sought to justify its actions through cultural arguments.'34
American exceptionalism, noting that "[American] [h]ypocrisy is not the unambiguous evil that
it is usually made out to be; it often serves an honorable and important role in domestic and international politics").
129 See, for example, Rasul v Bush, 124 S Ct 2686 (2004).
130 See, for example, Abbasi v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs,
2002 EWCA Civ 1598 (2002).
131 See Jess Bravin, Panel Says U.S. Policy on Detainees in Cuba Breaks InternationalLaw,
Wall St J B2 (Mar 14,2002).
132 See Glenn Frankel, Belgian War Crimes Law Undone by Its Global Reach, Wash Post
A01 (Sept 30, 2003). For a general criticism of universal jurisdiction as a legal innovation, see
Henry Kissinger, The Pitfalls of UniversalJurisdiction,Foreign Affairs 86 (July/Aug 2001).
133 In fact, the Supreme Court upheld the use of the ATCA to enforce human rights law.
See Sosa v Alvarez-Machain, 124 S Ct 2739,2765-66 (2004).
134 For example, to counter allegations that the United States's treatment of Guantanamo
Bay detainees violated international law, the State Department has not made cultural arguments.
Instead, it has argued that the detainees are "enemy combatants" rather than "prisoners of war,"
and thus they are not protected by the Geneva Convention See Dieter Fleck, Towards A Code
of Conduct for Non-internationalArmed Conflicts: Current Efforts, Problems and Opportunities,
96 Am Socy Intl L Proceedings 25, 30 (2002). Another example involves allegations that the
United States's use of capital punishment violates international law. The United States does not
make cultural arguments to justify its use of capital punishment. Instead, defenses of American
capital punishment are generally a complex composite of consequentialist and retributivist ar-
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Indeed, by singing the song of cultural relativism, the United States
exposes itself to new legal consequences.

The remainder of this Part discusses the conceptual framework
for. applying estoppel and treaty suspension to the United States's
treatment of universalism. Although a single Comment cannot adequately address the comprehensive merits and weaknesses of such applications, this Comment should serve as a springboard for further discussion of the ideas proposed below.
A. International Estoppel
In the 1984 ruling in Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States), "' the

International Court of Justice (ICJ) stated that "estoppel may be inferred from the conduct, declarations and the like made by a State
which ... has caused another State or States, in reliance on such con-

duct, detrimentally to change position or suffer some prejudice. ' '3 In

1962, in Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v
Thailand),' Judge Alfaro of the ICJ noted that international estoppel

law estoppel.'
differs significantly from Anglo-American common

Common law estoppel has evolved into numerous subcategories of estoppel-such as collateral, equitable, and promissory estoppel--all of

which are governed by complex and technical rules. In contrast, international estoppel is simply defined, broadly grounded in notions of
"The primary foundation of this principle
good faith and consistency ...
is the good faith that must prevail in international relations, inasmuch
guments. See Mary Sigler, Contradiction, Coherence, and Guided Discretion in the Supreme
Court's Capital Sentencing Jurisprudence,40 Am Crim L Rev 1151, 1154-61 (2003) (discussing
arguments used to justify capital punishment). See also Carol S. Steiker, CapitalPunishment and
American Exceptionalism, 81 Or L Rev 97 (2002) (explaining that the reasoning behind the
American death penalty is multifaceted). Although retributivist reasoning may include cultural
biases, the hybrid nature of the United States's defense of capital punishment is distinguishable
from the purely cultural arguments it uses to justify nonrecognition of sexual orientation rights.
Furthermore, in international litigation regarding the death penalty, the United States has
avoided defending capital punishment per se, and has instead defended itself through procedural
arguments. See Richard J. Wilson, The United States' Position on the Death Penalty in the InterAmerican Human Rights System, 42 Santa Clara L Rev 1159, 1183-84 (2002) (noting that, in recent international litigation addressing the use of capital punishment, the United States defended itself by challenging the forum's authority and jurisdiction). Because of its hybrid nature,
the defense of capital punishment is not an endorsement of cultural relativism that satisfies international estoppel's "clear and unambiguous" test (discussed in Part IVA) or treaty suspension's "changed circumstances" requirement (discussed in Part IV.B).
135 1984 ICJ 392.
136 Id at 415.
137 1962 ICJ 6.
138 Id at 39.
139 See Megan L. Wagner, Comment, Jurisdictionby Estoppel in the InternationalCourt of
Justice, 74 Cal L Rev 1777, 1778 (1986) ("In contrast [to common law estoppel], international estoppel draws more sweeping lines.").
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as inconsistency of conduct or opinion on the part of a state to the
prejudice of another is incompatible with good faith. ' " °0
After surveying international case law, treatises have restated international estoppel as a three-pronged test. For example, according to
Ian Brownlie's Principles of Public InternationalLaw, estoppel exists
in international customary law where: (1) there is a statement that is
"clear and unambiguous"; (2) the statement is "voluntary,
unconditional, and authorized"; and (3) there is "reliance in good faith upon
the statement either to the detriment of the party so relying on the
statement or to the advantage of the party making the statement."''
Considering the broad scope of international estoppel, the United
States may face consequences for endorsing cultural relativism. If the
United States continues to apply cultural relativism to sexual orientation, it may be estopped in the future from applying universalism to
other areas of human rights.
Turning to estoppel's three-part test, what would constitute a
"clear and unambiguous" statement that the United States
has begun
to endorse relativism? The United States need not expressly state that
it has adopted elements of cultural relativism. After all, the ICJ has
held that "conduct" speaks as loudly as declarations.'42 Thus, by withholding certain rights from sexual minorities while citing Christianity
in lawmaking, the United States sends a statement that despite condemnation from the UN Human Rights Committee,'43 it will not fully
extend the ICCPR's antidiscrimination provision to sexual minorities
because of American cultural biases. As sexual orientation continues
to develop as a human right, the United States will need to address
the issue more frequently in international affairs. Future statements
will likely render the United States's cultural relativism even clearer.
The second prong is easy to satisfy. The ICJ has set a low bar for
determining what types of government statements are voluntary, unconditional, authorized, and therefore binding. In Nuclear Tests Case
(Australia v France),'" France made general public announcements
that it would discontinue atmospheric nuclear tests. The ICJ held that
France was legally bound by its statements, even though there was no
formal dialogue between France and the other party in the case, Australia.141 The ICJ held that France's statements were legally binding be-

140Cambodia v Thailand, 1962 ICJ at 42.
141 Ian Brownie, Principles of PublicInternationalLaw 646 (Oxford
5thed 1998).
142 Nicaragua v United States, 1984 ICJ at 415 ("[E]stoppel may
be inferred from the conduct, declarations and the like made by a State.") (emphasis added).
143 See note 94.
144 1974 ICJ 253.
145 Id at 267-71.
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cause (1) they were made to the public, and (2) they manifested an intent to be bound.'4

In Nuclear Tests, the ICJ cited a presidential press conference and

a televised interview as examples of public unilateral statements that
manifest an intent to be bound.47 Thus, one can infer that the Bush
administration's press conferences are equally binding. As discussed in
Part III.A, the Bush administration has put forth cultural defenses of
the FMA in more than one press conference. Those binding press
statements serve as evidence of the United States's relativist position. "'
The third prong is also relatively easy to satisfy. Consider this example: states such as China have advocated cultural relativism for

quite some time. However, if the United States begins to adopt relativism, China may rely on American conduct to base its policies more
confidently on cultural relativism. Thus, China may increase its crackdown on political dissidents, citing Confucian norms in which community and social authority trump individual political expression. China
could assert that, because the United States interprets the ICCPR

through a Christian lens, it believed that the United States would con-

done China's interpretation of the ICCPR through a Confucian lens.
Essentially, China could assert that it relied on American conduct to
conclude that the United States would no longer hold it to a universal
standard.

Thus, if the United States continues to assert cultural relativism,
holding it to a uniChina may seek to prevent the United States from
4
versal standard. China may file a suit in the ICJ,' ' seeking an ICJ order
Id.
Id. One should note, however, that Nuclear Tests has elicited much criticism for not
clearly defining "intent to be bound." See Jan Klabbers, The Concept of Treaty in International
the
Law 197-98 (Kluwer 1996) (noting that a determination of French intentions "necessitated
subIn
controversial").
quite
"proved
Tests
Nuclear
that
and
legal equivalent of a quantum leap,"
"ausequent cases, the ICJ may narrow the definition of "intent to be bound" and a statement's
satisfy.
to
difficult
more
prong
second
thority," thus rendering estoppel's
marriage, the UN Human
148 Although there is arguably no fundamental right to same-sex
can amount to a violamarriage
same-sex
against
laws
that
dicta
in
Rights Committee has stated
heterotion of the ICCPR if partnership laws do not give same-sex couples the rights granted to
Commun
UN
Comm,
Rts
Hum
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Zealand,
New
v
sexual married couples. See Joslin
unless a
902/1999, Doc A/57/40 (July 30, 2002) (Lallah and Scheinin concurring) (stating that,
to or
similar
consequences
with
partnership
same-sex
of]
state's laws allow for "recogni[tion
couples
identical with those of marriage ... [the] denial of certain rights or benefits to same-sex
article 26
that are available to married couples may amount to discrimination prohibited under
has yet to
[the ICCPR's antidiscrimination provision]"). (The UN Human Rights Committee
to this
hear a claim directly on point; thus, it has addressed the question only in dicta.) According
guaranteeing
logic, China can argue that Bush's use of religion to promote the FMA, while not
same-sex partnership rights, amounts to an act of cultural relativism.
149 Since 1985, the United States has accepted ICJ jurisdiction only on an ad hoc basis. If
China brought an estoppel claim against the United States in the ICJ, the United States would
in pubhave the option to decline jurisdiction. However, because of the growing role of litigation
146
147
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of provisional measure, which is akin to an injunction."o At present,
the State Department regularly issues statements condemning China
for not embracing the universality of individual rights. In reaction to

such condemnation, China could argue that the United States was
misinterpreting the ICCPR and seek an order against the United
"

States. ' Once the United States defended its State Department reports through universalist interpretation of the ICCPR, China could

attempt to estop the United States from making such an assertion.
China could note that the United States employed cultural relativism
as a tool for interpreting the ICCPR in its withholding of the ICCPR's

protections from sexual minorities. Subsequently, China could argue
that the United States must be estopped from asserting that cultural
relativism is an inappropriate tool for interpreting the ICCPR. As discussed above, all three prongs of the test for estoppel may be satisfied.
Will China really be motivated to file a suit with the ICJ? One

may speculate that condemnation in State Department reports will

lic international law, the United States would be under considerable international pressure
to accept jurisdiction, unless the State Department issued a convincing statement that China's
claim
was frivolous. See Richard B. Bilder, The United States and the World Court in the Post-"Cold
War" Era, 40 Cath U L Rev 251,260-61 (1991) (noting that the United States may incur
significant political costs by not submitting to the IC's jurisdiction). See also Jenny S. Martinez,
Towards an InternationalJudicial System, 56 Stan L Rev 429,436-44 (2003) (discussing the growing
role of litigation in international public law). But see John R. Cook, The InternationalCourt
of
Justice and Human Rights, 1 Nw U J Intl Hum Rts 2, 5 (2004) (expressing skepticism regarding
states consenting to ICJ jurisdiction). If the United States declined ICJ jurisdiction, the
State
Department would likely be under international pressure to explain why China's estoppel
claim
is frivolous. Thus, the United States would need to defend itself against the estoppel claim
one
way or another.
Even if the United States declines jurisdiction at the ICJ,states can raise an estoppel argument against the United States in the UN Human Rights Committee. The United States
has, in
fact, agreed to submit itself to the UN Human Rights Committee's power to review adversarial
claims related to the ICCPR. 138 Cong Rec 8070 § 111(3) (1992) (ratifying the ICCPR and
declaring that the United States "accepts the competence of the Human Rights Committee
[to review adversarial claims] ...under Article 41 of the ICCPR"). Thus, any Member State
of the
ICCPR can file with the Committee a complaint against the United States for its sexual
orientation laws and, once the United States raises a cultural argument, the doctrine of estoppel
can be
invoked.
For the purposes of this Comment, I will discuss the estoppel claim in the context of the
ICJ
because an ICJ judgment would carry the greater weight. An ICJ judgment would be binding
between the litigant states, whereas a UN Human Rights Committee opinion would be advisory
in
nature, but highly persuasive. Although my discussion uses the ICJ as an example forum,
my
analysis also applies to the UN Human Rights Committee because the Committee reaches
its
decisions using the same sources of law as the 10, including the general principles of international law expressed in ICJ case law.
150 Statute of the ICJ Art 41, online at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/
ibasictext/ibasicstatute.htm (visited Aug 16, 2004). See also Bernard H. Oxman and William
J.
Aceves, Lagrand, 96 Amer J Intl L 210 (2002) (discussing the binding nature of provisional
orders).
151 Article 36 of the Statute of the ICJ grants the ICJ jurisdiction
to hear disputes over the
interpretation of treaties.
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not trigger such a drastic response from China. However, if Chinese
political dissidents continue to sue Chinese officials via ATCA
claims,"2 and if American courts interpret the ICCPR under a universalist lens during the ATCA suit, China may feel more compelled to
bring a claim to the ICJ. China may resort to the ICJ to stop American
federal courts from barring cultural defenses against ATCA claims.
The ICJ could estop the United States from asserting universalism
to
with regard to the ICCPR and, accordingly, order American courts
3 An
officials."
Chinese
against
cases
ATCA
allow cultural defenses in
ICJ order requiring American courts to allow cultural defenses in
ATCA cases would not be the first time that the ICJ directed an order
at American courts. In March 2004, the ICJ ordered American courts
"
lthough there are no formal
to review fifty-one death penalty cases.
mechanisms for enforcing the ICJ's orders, noncompliance with ICJ
'
orders tarnishes a state's international reputation.
Skeptics may argue that international estoppel should be interpreted narrowly, so that the United States should be estopped from
holding other states to universalism on sexual orientation matters and
sexual orientation matters only. That is to say, the United States can
distinguish its position on sexual orientation from its position on other
rights, such as political expression. Even though sexual orientation
rights and political rights are not the same thing, they are governed by
the same treaties: the ICCPR, for example. The ICJ has noted that,
under the doctrine of international estoppel, a state may not "deny[]
that a certain treaty is applicable" to one case while alleging that another state has "not complied with certain provisions of that [same]
treaty." 6 Thus, if the United States uses cultural relativism to deny application of the ICCPR to sexual minorities, it can be estopped from
preventing China's use of cultural relativism to deny application of the
ICCPR to political dissidents because the parallel scenarios stem from
the same treaty.
Although the doctrine of international estoppel is firmly rooted
in law, it rarely has been formally invoked. This may be due to the fact
See note 62 and accompanying text.
See generally Cambodia v Thailand, 1962 ICJ 6 (estopping Thailand from asserting its
territorial claim and ordering Thailand to withdraw forces from the territory).
Cases of Mexi154 See Marlise Simons and Tim Weiner, U.N. Court Orders U.S. to Review
31,2004).
(Mar
Al
Times
NY
cans,
Interna155 See Roger R Alford, The Proliferation of InternationalCourts and Tribunals:
of
("Decisions
(2000)
163
160,
Proceedings
L
Intl
Socy
Am
94
tional Adjudication in Ascendance,
the ICJ and human rights tribunals often are adhered to because of the legitimacy and inherent
fairness of the norm enunciated and because of fear of loss of reputation for noncompliance.").
But see John Yoo and Eric Posner, International Court of Hubris, Wall St J A18 (Apr 7, 2004)
(arguing that ICJ rulings against the United States only tarnish the ICJ's reputation).
156 Cambodia v Thailand, 1962 ICJ at 50 (emphasis added).
152

153
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that most inconsistencies in international law are resolved through diplomacy rather than litigation. The doctrine has mostly been invoked
in territorial and jurisdictional disputes.'57 However, as noted above,
there is an increasing trend in international law toward dealing with
exceptionalism through transnational legal proceedings. Recently, international law scholars have argued that international estoppel can
be legitimately applied to expropriation cases'm as well as cases on
state succession.' Along those lines, it would be reasonable also to
apply international estoppel to the debate on universalism. The doctrine has never been invoked in the human rights context, but there is
little reason why it should not apply to human rights. After all, the
principles of good faith and consistency should not be compromised in
human rights law any more than they are compromised in other sectors of international law.
B.

Treaty Suspension

If the United States continues to assert cultural relativism with
regards to sexual orientation, other relativist states might develop a
right to suspend existing human rights treaties that were established
on an underlying assumption of universalism. Treaty suspension is not
an immediate risk because parties wishing to suspend treaties are held
to a heavy burden of proof. Nonetheless, if the United States's advocacy of cultural relativism intensifies and other states join the United
States in applying cultural relativism to sexual orientation rights,
treaty suspension will become a possibility.
The international customary law doctrine, rebus sic substantis,literally means "things standing thus." Black's Law Dictionary defines
the doctrine as the "principle that all agreements are concluded with
the implied condition that they are binding only as long as there are
no major changes in the circumstances."',' The Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties' Article 62 acknowledges the doctrine, but limits it
as such:
A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with
regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty,
and which was not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as
a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty unless:
157 See Wagner, Comment, 74 Cal L Rev at 1777 (cited in note
139) (noting that historically
estoppel had been invoked in territorial disputes, but in 1984 the ICJ twice applied
estoppel to
jurisdictional disputes).
158 See Robert L. Muse, The Nationality of Claims Principleof
PublicInternationalLaw and
the Helms-Burton Act, 20 Hastings Intl & Comp L Rev 777,795-96 (1997).
159 See Peter K. Yu, Succession by Estoppel: Hong Kong's Succession
to the ICCPR, 27 Pepperdine L Rev 53,89-93 (1999).
160 Black's Law Dictionary 1274 (West 7th ed 1999).
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(a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the
treaty; and
(b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations still to be performed under the treaty. "
The International Law Committee (ILC) Commentary on Article
62 suggests that states wishing to suspend a treaty because of changed
circumstances should be held to a heavy burden of proving Article
62's two prongs. The Commentary notes "the need to confine the
scope of the doctrine within narrow limits and to regulate strictly the
conditions under which it may be invoked ....The circumstances of
international life are always changing and it is easy to allege that the
'62
changes render [a] treaty inapplicable."
The ICJ has addressed treaty suspension due to changed circumstances in only three cases: The Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases (United
63 and Federal Republic of Germany v IcelandM )
Kingdom v Iceland'
and Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary!
Slovakia).165 The ICJ's reasoning was similar in all three cases and the
ICJ rejected the treaty suspension claim all three times. A look at the
most recent case, Gabcikovo-Nagymaros,sheds light on the ICJ's high
bar for treaty suspension claims.
In Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, the ICJ emphasized its narrow definition of "essential" circumstances, "radical" transformation of obligations, and foreseeability. In 1977, Hungary and Slovakia'66 agreed to
jointly construct a hydroelectric plant on the Danube. Hungary, a former socialist state, claimed that the agreement was suspended due to
changed circumstances. It argued that the states' partnership served
the purpose of socialist integration; thus, socialism was a fundamental
circumstance leading to the joint venture.
Contrary to Hungary's claim, the ICJ found that socialism was
but one of several circumstances leading to the 1977 treaty. The treaty
it also served'
not only furthered the two states' socialist partnership;
and preventing floods.6
electricity
providing
like
goals,
basic
more
The ICJ stated that the political and economic goals of socialism were

161

Dietrich Rauschning, ed, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 420 (Metzner

1978).
Id at 428.
1973 ICJ 3.
164 1974 ICJ 175.
165 1997 ICJ 7.
was part of
166 At the time of the agreement, Slovakia (also known as the Slovak Republic)
the former Czechoslovakia.
95.
167 Id
168 Id $ 104.
162
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"not so closely linked to the object and purpose of the Treaty that they
constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties. ' ' The ICJ
also noted that, although the project's profitability diminished over
time, that difference did not amount to a "radical" transformation of
70
obligation, which is necessary for treaty suspension.'
Alternatively,
Hungary claimed that changed circumstances regarding environmental laws rendered the project more burdensome. In response, the
ICJ noted: "The Court does not consider that new developments in
the state of environmental knowledge and of environmental law can
be said to have been completely unforeseen.'""
Despite the high bar set by the ICJ, a change in the dynamics of
the universalism debate may suffice to suspend certain human rights
treaties, such as CEDAW. In many ways, such a treaty suspension
claim would be more clear cut than those brought forth in cases like
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros. First, using CEDAW as an example, one can
immediately identify universalism as an essential assumption of the
treaty. After all, CEDAW stands for the "Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women," and the plain
language of the treaty requires states to "modify social and cultural
patterns of conduct" that are discriminatory."' Some states, such as the
Muslim states, consented to CEDAW only as a result of pressure to
conform to the existing assumption of universalism within the human
rights regime.
This situation contrasts with the GabcikovoNagymaros case, in which Hungary and Slovakia very well may have
consented to their agreement for the sake of generating energy, even
if socialism were not part of the circumstances in 1977.
When Muslim states tried to fashion a compromise through a
treaty reservation, Westerners pointed to the fact that those reservations were invalid because they would circumvent the main purpose of
CEDAW, which is to protect universal human rights for women."4 In
light of these facts, Muslim states have a strong case that a norm of
universalism was an essential circumstance leading to CEDAW.
The challenge that Muslim states would face is proving that the
circumstances have changed significantly enough to trigger treaty suspension. It is unlikely that a change in the American position alone
can be deemed to be a departure from the human rights regime's assumption of universalism. However, if the United States became more
outspoken and convinced other Western states to approach sexual
169
170
171
172
173
174

Id (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
CEDAW Arts 2(f), 5(a).
See An-Na'im, 3 Harv Hum Rts J at 15 (cited in note 27).
See text accompanying notes 54-57.
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orientation from a relativist point of view, the universalism debate
could very well reach a new tipping point. Accordingly, Muslim states
could argue that the human rights regime's assumption of universalism
has significantly "changed" and that existing treaties, like CEDAW,
should be reconsidered.
Those who are skeptical of a treaty suspension claim brought by
Muslim states may argue that, even if the universalist assumption
changes, Muslim states' obligations pursuant to CEDAW do not radically transform. That is, the cultural compromises that Muslim states
must make pursuant to CEDAW do not change just because cultural
relativism now applies to sexual orientation. This argument, however,
is myopic because it overlooks heavy political costs.
Although in practice Muslim states should continue to modify
their customs pursuant to CEDAW regardless of the debate over sexual orientation, the political costs associated with those compromises
would intensify enormously if the human rights regime no longer assumed a norm of universalism. If Muslim states cannot exercise cultural relativism, but Western states may do so, they are no longer
submitting themselves to an "overlapping consensus"; rather, they are
submitting themselves to a blatant assertion that American culture is
superior. The notion that all states must evolve to satisfy universal
norms becomes replaced by the notion that Muslim states must evolve
to satisfy American norms.
Thus, although the changed circumstances of the universalism
debate may not raise the direct implementation costs for Muslim
states, the changed circumstances create new political costs. One
should not understate these political costs by refusing to acknowledge
them as "radical." After all, in light of Samuel Huntington's "Clash of
Civilizations" thesis, " the international community should be aware
that such a blatant subordination of Muslim civilization translates into
very significant costs to political integrity.
Skeptics might also argue that a change in the universalist assumption should have been foreseeable. But an assumption of universalism has undergirded the human rights regime since its establishment in the 1940s. When Muslim and Asian states issued the Cairo
and Bangkok Declarations, respectively, they failed to significantly alter the human rights regime. Subsequent international conferences
continued to result in human rights treaties with underlying assumptions of universalism. In light of the consistency of universalism over
175 Huntington argues that international affairs are entering a new era, in which interna-

a
tional conflict will be defined along cultural lines that define discrete civilizations; in this era,
high value will be assigned to the integrity of a state's culture. See Samuel P Huntington, The
Clash of Civilizations?,72 Foreign Aff 22 (Summer 1993).
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the past six decades, it is reasonable to argue that a shift in the universalism debate was not foreseeable.
To bring a claim suspending CEDAW, a Muslim state would need
only to file a claim with the ICJ.'76 One can use Saudi Arabia as an example. When Saudi Arabia filed a reservation to CEDAW citing the
incompatibility between CEDAW and Shariah, other states and international law scholars objected to the reservation, concluding that the
reservation is invalid and that Saudi Arabia must be held to CEDAW's universal obligations." If the universalist-relativist balance
shifts far enough, Saudi Arabia may file an ICJ suit against any state
that condemns its noncompliance with CEDAW. If the balance shifts
enough, Saudi Arabia can argue that it is no longer beholden to CEDAW's universalist obligations because CEDAW has been suspended.
Although the bar for treaty suspension claims is high, CEDAW
may be subjected to treaty suspension if the United States's cultural
relativism grows enough to undermine the human rights regime's underlying assumption of universalism. Compared to the GabcikovoNagymaros case, the CEDAW example more easily satisfies the requirements for treaty suspension. First, the nexus between universalism and CEDAW is tighter than the nexus between socialism and the
1977 Hungarian-Slovakian agreement. Second, the political costs in
the CEDAW example are more radical than the reduction of profits in
the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case. And third, a change in the underlying
universalist assumption in human rights was not foreseeable, whereas
new environmental laws should have been foreseeable in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case.
Although treaty suspension has rarely been invoked in the past, it
may become a more often utilized tool in international law. Recently,
international law scholars have suggested that treaty suspension due
to changed circumstances can apply to treaties including the U.S.Soviet Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty,7 ' the Oslo Accords,'79 and the San
Francisco Peace Treaty. ' 8 Human rights treaties may be next.
CONCLUSION

There exists a double standard between the United States's advocacy of universalism in human rights law and its application of cultural
For background on ICJ jurisdiction, see notes 149-51.
See note 57.
178 See Frederic L. Kirgis, Proposed Missile Defenses and the ABM Treaty, online at
http://www.asil.orglinsights/insigh70.htm (visited Aug 16,2004).
179 See John Quigley, The Oslo Accords: More Than Israel Deserves, 12 Am U J Intl L &
Policy 285 (1997).
180 See Makoto Nishigai, Comment, The Comfort Women Case in the United States, 20 Wis
Intl L J 371 (2002).
176
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relativism to sexual orientation rights, and the United States may pay
legal consequences for this double standard. Through the doctrines of
estoppel and treaty suspension, the United States may be forced to
abandon the universalist standard that it fought hard to establish in
areas of human rights including women's rights and freedom of political expression.
Skeptics may note that the estoppel and treaty suspension claims
have not yet fully ripened. However, human rights related to sexual
orientation are likely to grow, drawing a sharper contrast with the
United States's relativist stance on the issue. As a result, estoppel and
treaty suspension claims will become increasingly compelling, so long
as the United States maintains its current posture on sexual orientation.
The human rights regime is presently grounded in an assumption
that human rights are universal. However, that universalism is being
tested by the American position on sexual orientation.

